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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
                
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 Aaron Thomas appeals from a judgment of conviction and 
sentence entered on April 26, 1994, sentencing him to a custodial 
term of 169 months to be followed by a three-year term of 
supervised release.  The sentence also included a provision for 
restitution not implicated on this appeal.  The court imposed the 
sentence on Thomas' conviction based on a plea of guilty to bank 
robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a).  Through the 
application of the career offender section of the Sentencing 
Guidelines, his guideline range was established as 151 to 188 
months predicated on a total offense level of 29.  See U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines § 4B1.1 (1993).  Without the career 
offender designation, his total offense level would have been 22.  
 Thomas' career offender status was calculated on the 
basis of two convictions, a 1987 burglary conviction in 
Philadelphia and a 1992 robbery conviction in Bucks County, 
Pennsylvania, both convictions having been based on pleas of 
guilty.  As he did in the district court, Thomas challenges the 
use of his 1992 conviction for robbery to fix his status as a 
career offender.  He predicates this argument on the contentions 
  
that he believed in 1992 that he was pleading guilty only to 
theft and that the state judge failed to inform him of several of 
his constitutional rights when he pleaded guilty.  The district 
court found that the state convictions were valid. 
 We reject Thomas' argument.  In Custis v. United 
States, 114 S.Ct. 1732 (1994), the Supreme Court held that except 
when a conviction is obtained in violation of a defendant's right 
to counsel, a defendant has no constitutional or statutory 
grounds to attack collaterally the validity of previous state 
convictions cited to enhance his sentence under the Armed Career 
Criminal Act.  18 U.S.C. § 924(e).  We previously had held in 
United States v. Brown, 991 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir. 1993), that the 
Sentencing Guidelines grant discretion to district courts to 
entertain constitutional challenges at sentencing to prior 
convictions used to establish criminal histories.  But we reached 
this conclusion on the authority of a background note to U.S. 
Sentencing Guideline § 4A1.2 which we construed to mean "that the 
courts should work out their own procedural rules regarding 
efforts by defendants to challenge convictions not previously 
held unconstitutional."  Brown, 991 F.2d at 1166.  Thus, we did 
not conclude in Brown that either the Guidelines or the 
Constitution itself compelled us to permit constitutional 
challenges to prior convictions used to establish criminal 
histories under the guidelines.1   
                     
1
.  The background note on which we relied in United States v. 
Brown recited that the Sentencing "Commission leaves for court 
determination the issue of whether a defendant may collaterally 
attack at sentencing a prior conviction."  This note was deleted 
  
 Custis, of course, has altered the situation with 
respect to challenges to prior convictions.  Furthermore, we see 
no principled way to distinguish a challenge to a prior 
conviction used to justify an enhancement under the guidelines 
from a prior conviction used to justify an enhancement under the 
Armed Career Criminal Act.  Custis teaches that unless the 
statute under which the defendant is sentenced explicitly 
provides the right to attack collaterally prior convictions used 
to enhance the sentence, no such right should be implied.  
Custis, 114 S.Ct. at 1736 (contrasting the Armed Career Criminal 
Act with other statutes "expressly permit[ting] repeat offenders 
to challenge prior convictions that are used for enhancement 
purposes").  In Brown itself we acknowledged that U.S. Sentencing 
Guideline § 4A1.2 provides no such right explicitly, but only 
authorizes courts to work out their own procedural rules.  Brown, 
991 F.2d at 1166.  In the absence of such explicit authorization, 
Guideline 4A1.2 stands in the same posture as the Armed Career 
Criminal Act addressed in Custis.   
 Consequently, we will follow the lead of the Supreme 
Court by holding that a district court, when sentencing a 
(..continued) 
effective November 1, 1993, when the Commission amended 
application note 6 to section 4A1.2 to provide that "With respect 
to the current sentencing proceeding, this guideline and 
commentary do not confer upon the defendant any right to attack 
collaterally a prior conviction or sentence beyond any rights 
otherwise recognized in law (e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 851 expressly 
provides that a defendant may collaterally attack certain prior 
convictions)."  We, however, are treating this case as though the 
deleted note was still in the commentary and thus rely on Custis 
and not the amendment to the commentary to reach our result. 
  
defendant classified as a career offender under section 4B1.1, 
cannot entertain a constitutional challenge to the underlying 
convictions except in a case in which the defendant's right to 
counsel had been denied.  In reaching this result, we join the 
other courts of appeal which have declined to distinguish section 
4B1.1 from the Armed Career Criminal Act for the purpose of 
considering challenges to prior convictions.  United States v. 
Garcia,     F.3d    ,    , No. 94-5028 (10th Cir. 1994); United 
States v. Killion, 30 F.3d 844, 846 (7th Cir. 1994); United 
States v. Jones, 28 F.3d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. 
Jones, 27 F.3d 50, 51-52 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 377 
(1994).  See also United States v. Munoz, 36 F.3d 1229, 1237-38 
(1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Ullyses-Salazar, 28 F.3d 932, 
939 (9th Cir. 1994).   
 In addition to distinguishing section 4B1.1 from the 
Armed Career Criminal Act, Thomas seeks to avoid Custis on two 
other bases.  First, he contends that inasmuch as the government 
did not urge in the district court that he could not challenge 
the 1992 conviction, it cannot make that contention now.  We 
reject this contention because the Supreme Court decided Custis 
after the court sentenced Thomas, and the government was not 
obliged to make an argument in the district court barred by 
Brown.  We also observe that the government raises Custis to 
affirm rather than to reverse the judgment from which the appeal 
was taken.  We think that whatever might be true in other 
situations, in this unusual case in which the Supreme Court 
effectively changed the law after the completion of the district 
  
court proceedings, the government should be permitted to rely on 
the new ruling to uphold the district court's judgment. 
 Second, Thomas contends that Custis does not preclude a 
challenge to a prior conviction itself in a state or federal 
habeas corpus proceeding nor, in his view, does it preclude a 
federal habeas corpus attack to an enhanced sentenced predicated 
on an invalid prior conviction.  See Nichols v. United States, 
114 S.Ct. 1921, 1937 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Custis, 
114 S.Ct. at 1746 (Souter, J., dissenting).  We, however, have no 
reason to address those possibilities.  The only issue before us 
is whether at the time of the sentencing the district court may 
entertain constitutional challenges to underlying convictions 
used to enhance sentences.  We conclude that, except in cases in 
which a conviction was obtained in violation of a defendant's 
right to counsel, we should follow Custis and hold that such 
challenges are precluded in cases under section 4B1.1. 
 The judgment of conviction and sentence of April 26, 
1994, will be affirmed. 
  
